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Abstract The Srebrenica tragedy has given rise to many responses of political,
judicial and semi-judicial nature. One mechanism that has perhaps received less
attention than the adjudicatory performances is the institution of inquiry. This article
contrasts the two most prominent formal inquiries into the fall of Srebrenica by the
UN and the Dutch NIOD and it offers valuable insights into the role and authority of
inquiry exercises regarding international affairs and moments of crisis. The article
also examines the function of ex post facto inquiries as compared to judicial
exercises. Given that inquiry processes generally establish a greater set of facts
which are not tied up to legal categories, it is argued that the institution of inquiry
may fulfil a complementary function to legal processes as it can offer a more
comprehensive account of events and thus address societal demands for the
accountability of a wider range of actors.
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1 Introduction
On 11 July 1995, the enclave of Srebrenica was taken without any effective
international resistance or comprehensive protection efforts. The absence of candid
action during the fall of Srebrenica contrasts sharply with the multitude of reactions
thereafter. The myriad of responses were spread out over a significant amount of
time, up to two decades. They were of a political, judicial and semi-judicial nature,
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and they all shared comparable moral undertones.1 One relevant mechanism has
perhaps received less attention than the adjudicatory performances. This is the
institution of inquiry. In fact there have been multiple fact-finding exercises into the
fall of Srebrenica, both international as well as domestic in nature and of both a
formal as well as an informal character.2
This contribution zeroes in on the method of inquiry as a response to the fall of
Srebrenica. It singles out two formal inquiries that have been the most prominent:
the UN inquiry and the inquiry by the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumen-
tatie (NIOD) [the Dutch Institute for War Documentation].3 The international UN
inquiry was policy-driven and diplomatic in nature,4 while the domestic Dutch
undertaking had a more historical and scientific orientation.5 Comparing the two
offers valuable insights into the role and authority of inquiry exercises regarding
international affairs and moments of crisis. This article thus endeavours to provide
some understanding of factors that are relevant to shaping the authority of inquiry
1 Judicial responses took place within different jurisdictions. At the ICJ, the central case was Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement of 26 February 2007. The most important Srebrenica litigation at the
ICTY took place in the cases of The Prosecutor v. Karadzˇic´, Case No. IT-95-5/18, judgement expected in
December 2015;TheProsecutor v.Mladic´, CaseNo. IT-09-92;TheProsecutor v. Krstic´, CaseNo. IT-98-33,
Appeals Judgement on 19 April 2004; The Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ and Jokic´, Case No. IT-02-60, Appeals
Judgement on 9May 2007; The Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2, Appeals Judgement on 8 April
2015; The Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., Case No. IT-05-88, Appeals Judgement on 30 January 2015; and the
case The Prosecutor v. Oric´, Case No. IT-03-68, Appeals Judgement on 3 July 2008. Relevant domestic
litigation occurred in the Netherlands in the civil cases of Nuhanovic´ and Mustafic´ et al., and Mother of
Srebrenica, as well as in theKarremans criminal complaints case, cf. Art. 12 of the Dutch Code of Criminal
Procedure, see: SupremeCourt of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), State of the Netherlands v. Mustafic´ et al., 6
September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9228; Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), State of the
Netherlands v. Nuhanovic´, 6 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225. Supreme Court of the
Netherlands (Hoge Raad), Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. State of the Netherlands, 13 April 2012,
ECLI:NL:HR:BW1999, and District Court of The Hague, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. State of the
Netherlands, 16 July 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8562; Court of Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden,
MehidaMustafic´-Mujic´ et al. v. Karremans et al., 29April 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:2968. See also the
other contributions in this special issue.
2 Formal inquiries include: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Res. 53/35,
UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999; Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
(Brahimi report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000; NIOD (2002). Parliamentary inquiries
include: Missie zonder vrede. Enqueˆte Srebrenica [Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry] (chaired by Bert
Bakker), Tweede Kamerstuk 28 506, nr. 3, 2002–2003; Rapport d’information de´pose´ par la mission
d’information commune sur les e´ve´nements de Srebrenica, Enregistre´ a` la Pre´sidence de l’Assemble´e
Nationale, 22 November 2001. Informal inquiries e.g., by non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
include: The Fall of Srebrenica and the failure of UN peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Human
Rights Watch, Vol. 7, No. 13, October 1995. Human rights reporting includes: Situation of human rights
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, ECOSOC, periodic report submitted by Mr. Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1996/6, 5 July 1995 and
the report submitted by Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur on the Commission on Human Rights,
E/CN.4/1996/63, 14 March 1996.
3 As indicated in the previous footnote, the French inquired into the fall of Srebrenica through a
parliamentary commission, which is a different exercise than an independent inquiry and is therefore not
addressed in this essay.
4 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Res. 53/35 (hereafter UN Srebrenica
report), UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999, para. 5.
5 NIOD (2002), p. 10.
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findings and their reports and to shed some light on the function of ex post facto
inquiries as compared to judicial exercises. As an integral part of this twofold
purpose, the article also highlights how the two inquiries, which are inherently
supposed to be fact-finding exercises, engaged with certain questions of interna-
tional law and how this engagement was informed by their function.
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the concept of inquiry
and differentiates between types of inquiries and their respective functions. It
typifies both Srebrenica inquiries as being retrospective. Sections 2 and 3 then zero
in on the UN and Dutch inquiry respectively. Section 4 offers a brief comparative
analysis on the political and judicial reception of the respective UN and NIOD
findings and Sect. 5 concludes with some more generic observations on the
institution of inquiry in the contemporary international legal order.
2 Inquiry in International Law
International fact-finding has a long history in international law. The concept of
inquiry was introduced in the international society by the Russian diplomat
Friedrich Martens during The Hague peace negotiations of 1899 and 1907.6 While
initially designed as a purely fact-oriented inter-state dispute settlement mechanism
that would either pre-empt any further escalation of a conflict or be conducive to
mediation and conciliation initiatives, over time international commissions of
inquiry came to perform a great variety of functions, including with a more legal
orientation, in different institutional settings and for different purposes.7
Today, the most notable commissions of inquiry are those established by the
Human Rights Council. These commissions do not resemble their Hague
predecessors at all. In contrast to the archetypical Hague Commissions, the human
rights commissions of inquiry do not primarily aim to pacify and resolve disputes.
Instead, these commissions set out to alert the international community of ongoing
atrocities and human rights violations. In line with their mandate and their ‘alert
function’, human rights commissions of inquiry tend to frame their most crucial
findings as violations of international law rather than as findings of fact. The
underlying presumption and strategy thereof is that such framing more promptly
evokes a response or corrective action.8 As such, human rights commissions of
inquiry have moved beyond mere fact-finding and they engage with international
law quite expressly and purposefully. Such engagement remains without any
binding legal consequences though, while it does often have great moral or political
effect. It is effectively meant to borrow and rely on the authority of law.
In addition to the human rights commissions of inquiry, other types of inquiry
commissions still exist and function in parallel and distinct settings. For instance,
there are technical commissions of inquiry which find their basis in specialized
treaty regimes. Those technical commissions have remained more loyal to the
6 See for a historical overview of inquiry in international law, Van den Herik (2014).
7 Ibid.
8 Van den Herik and Harwood (2015) (forthcoming).
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Hague archetype. Examples of treaties that provide for inquiry as a modality of
dispute settlement beyond the setting of human rights and peace and security are the
1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
and the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses. In addition, fact-finding occurs as part of verification missions in the
context of arms control regimes. These are mostly done through on-site inspections,
e.g., within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention, or the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel
Mines. Generally the mandate of these commissions is to establish certain non-legal
‘empirical facts’ with a view to settling a given dispute or verifying certain claims.
They are thus less law-oriented. In particular constellations, these technical
commissions of inquiry are even expressly prohibited from drawing any conclusions
with a legal dimension, and most notably they can be barred from making normative
findings related to questions of responsibility. An example thereof is the inquiry
procedure under the International Convention for Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention), which has as its exclusive aim to prevent future aviation accidents.9
Beyond this host of specific inquiry mechanisms, there is no universal, all-
encompassing commission of inquiry generally empowered to engage in fact-
finding whenever the need arises. The theme-specific approach comports with the
current architecture of the international legal order. Even the centralization of the
power to maintain international peace and security in the Security Council has not
been accompanied by the establishment of a centralized security fact-finding
agency. Thus far, international decision-making in situations of conflict and other
threats to the peace has remained largely dependent on information presented by
individual states. The absence of such a universal or centralized body has at times
undermined the credibility, authority and stability of the whole collective security
system whose proper functioning hinges on the establishment of accurate factual
information and a shared appreciation and evaluation of facts. For instance and as
witnessed in the situation of Syria, the contestation of facts can contribute to a
stalemate within the Security Council. On other occasions, the Security Council has
acted on the basis of misinformation, such as the claims regarding the presence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (2003) and the attribution of the Madrid
terrorist attacks to ETA (2004).10 Commissions of inquiry can—to some extent—
prevent such mishaps and fulfil an investigative or diagnostic function and thus offer
a basis for informed decision-making.
9 Art. 26 of this Convention reads: ‘In the event of an accident to an aircraft of a contracting State
occurring in the territory of another contracting State, and involving death or serious injury, or indicating
serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the State in which the accident occurs
will institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident, in accordance, so far as its laws permit,
with the procedure which may be recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The
State in which the aircraft is registered shall be given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at
the inquiry and the State holding the inquiry shall communicate the report and findings in the matter to
that State’. Interestingly, Annex 13 to the Convention specifies in Standard 3.1 that, ‘the sole objective of
investigation of accidents or incidents shall be the prevention of accidents or incidents. It is not the
purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability’. In the Netherlands the Onderzoeksraad voor
Veiligheid [Dutch Safety Board] implements this obligation, e.g., in relation to the downing of the MH17.
10 UN Security Council Resolution 1530, 11 March 2004.
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On the basis of the above, a differentiation can be made between different types
of inquiries on the basis of subject-matter. Temporal considerations can form an
alternative basis for differentiation as some commissions operate ex ante with a
view to informing or prompting decision-making while other commissions perform
retrospective functions. Commissions of inquiry that operate in the aftermath of a
given incident or conflict situation often have mandates with educational and truth-
seeking underpinnings. They may also be expressly geared towards questions of
accountability or have a mission of exposure.
The Srebrenica inquiries are both examples of this retrospective type, albeit that
each inquiry had a slightly distinct purpose and mandate and operated in discrete
settings. These variances translated into different outcomes and emphases. To some
extent, retrospective formal fact-finding exercises are comparable to NGO
examinations, journalistic accounts and even the publication of monographs by
politicians and other involved individuals.11 All these initiatives share the objective
to enlighten and explain, and perhaps even more to reveal. On a sliding scale,
reports of fully external actors, and possibly in particular NGOs, tend to be more
inspired by naming-blaming-shaming dynamics, whereas at the other end of the
spectrum, State-initiated inquiries are often rather meant to stimulate a certain
introspection. More cynically, state-sponsored inquiries can also be intended or
perceived as attempts to dilute or circumvent responsibility.12 Yet, the main
difference between formal and informal fact-finding may be the relevant audience.
Formal fact-finding exercises are, at least officially, bound by their mandate and
they report principally to their parent body, even though they do have wider
radiation and are of course aware thereof. Informal fact-finders have at best informal
ties to formal authorities and in addition to policymakers, their primary audience
will often be the ‘court of public opinion’.
Beyond their formality, the function of commissions of inquiry and the authority
of their findings still depend on the greater spectrum of politics and expectations in
which they operate and of which they form part. In addition to those externalities,
the status of the parent body, the mandate, the working methods, procedures and
composition of commissions as well as the contents of an inquiry report may also be
determinant for its reception. The following two sections analyse and contrast the
two most prominent Srebrenica inquiries, i.e. the UN inquiry and the Dutch inquiry,
to explore how the setting in which they operated influenced their findings. A
subsequent section offers some insights into the political and judicial reception of
their reports and reflects on their respective authority.
11 See e.g., Hartmann (2015), Voorhoeve (2015).
12 See e.g., the concerns expressed by MSF in relation to the French Parliamentary inquiry, MSF,
Parliamentary inquiry of Srebrenica—Investigation or diversion, 11 November 2000, para. 5. The
concerns related, inter alia, to the appointment of former Defence Minister Le´otard who was in office
during the Fall of Srebrenica. Recognizing the potential of inquiries to function as de facto shielding
exercises, the Secretary-General pre-empted such critiques and expressly indicated that he ‘in no way
sought to deflect criticism directed at the United Nations Secretariat’.
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3 The UN Inquiry
Rwanda 1994 and Srebrenica 1995 are two great moments of shame and failure of
the international community and the United Nations specifically. The UN’s action,
or in fact its inaction, is recorded in two inquiry reports that were issued on 15 and
16 December 1999 for Srebrenica and Rwanda respectively. Interestingly, the
Rwanda inquiry was initiated by the Secretary-General13 and endorsed by the
Security Council, while the Srebrenica inquiry originated in a request from the
General Assembly.14 Subsequent to the creation of those two situation-specific
inquiries, Secretary-General Annan also established a more comprehensive and
thematic panel to assess the UN’s overall ability to conduct peace operations. This
high-level panel was chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi.
The principal instruction for the high-level panel chaired by Brahimi was to
assess ‘the shortcomings of the existing system’ and to formulate ‘frank, specific
and realistic recommendations for change’.15 The emphasis of the mandate was thus
forward-looking. In contrast, the Rwanda and Srebrenica inquiries were predom-
inantly retrospective in nature. The primary purpose of these independent inquiries
was ‘to establish the facts and to draw conclusions as to the response of the
Organization to the tragedy’,16 and ‘to explain why the United Nations failed’.17
Specifically, the UN Srebrenica inquiry aimed at scrutinizing the background of
the failure of the safe area policy with a view to ‘illuminate the process by which the
United Nations found itself, in July 1995, confronted with these shocking events’.
Within this setting, the purpose of the inquiry was twofold. It engaged with issues of
responsibility for the fall of Srebrenica specifically and it was meant to be a lessons-
learnt exercise on how international responses to conflicts should be formulated,
given shape and implemented.18 Even more concretely, it was hoped that through
the inquiry lessons could be drawn regarding the failed safe area policy. The inquiry
was premised on the idea that the United Nations shared responsibility with others
and that lessons were to be learnt both by the Secretariat as well as by Member
States. Yet, the inquiry’s account was principally given from a United Nations
perspective.19
This focus on the United Nations was corroborated by the selected methodology
of relying predominantly on archival research within the UN system, complemented
by interviews.20 Exceptionally, some classified files were entered in the public
record. Yet it was also noted that the United Nations had not disclosed the full
details of the attack on Srebrenica, and the report’s account of the attack was
13 UN Doc. S/1999/339, 26 March 1999 and UN Doc. S/1999/340, 26 March 1999.
14 UNGA Res. 53/35, 30 November 1998.
15 UN Brahimi report, para. 2.
16 Letter dated 18 March 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc. S/1999/339, 26 March 1999.
17 UN Srebrenica report, para. 3.
18 UN Srebrenica report, para. 5.
19 UN Srebrenica report, para. 7.
20 UN Srebrenica report, para. 8.
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reconstructed mainly from Dutchbat reports and the Dutch debriefing process,
complemented by other secondary sources and interviews.21 As regards the killings,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Prosecutor’s
files were a principal source of information. Early decisions in the cases against
Mladic´ and Karadzic´ and the indictment against Krstic´ constituted the basis of the
report’s findings, but they were not expressly cited so as not to jeopardize the
Tribunal’s ongoing work.22 The principal author of the report was David Harland, a
senior UN official who had been based in Bosnia during the events.
The overall tenor of the report is explicatory and it underlines the conceptual
flaws of the safe area policy. It contextualizes the fall of Srebrenica and addresses
the absence of air support during the fall. It also reports on the earlier hostage crisis
of May–June 1995 during which over four hundred UN personnel were taken
hostage by the Serbs and explains how this influenced ensuing events. The report
engages with claims that the hostages had been released in exchange for an
undertaking that no more air support would be used against the Serbs, but rejects
those rumours.23 Yet, US documents released in 2013 did reveal that a decision not
to use force had been made on 28 May 1995 by the UK, France and the US, i.e.,
during the hostage crisis.24 Given the confidentiality of these documents at the time
of the inquiry, they are missing from the UN report. The report thus left some
significant facts uncovered on crucial questions regarding the omission to provide
timely and adequate air support to prevent the fall of Srebrenica. On the issue of air
support, the report reads,
Some sources approached in the context of this report indicated that the
Dutchbat requested close air support at this time, or some earlier in the
morning (of 10 July), because the warning to the Serbs had been violated. The
request, if made, was not approved. It has not been possible to verify at what
level the request was turned down, if at all, as there is no written record of it,
and a number of the key personnel at each of the higher levels of command do
not recall any request having been received at that time.25
While some facts were thus left unclear, other facts remained contested. One
example is where the UN report states that the Dutchbat Commander, i.e.
Karremans, had indicated that the blocking positions defending Srebrenica could
still hold and that air support could wait until the next morning.26 The NIOD report
explicitly questions this finding.27
Despite this contestation and even if the report does not capture all the relevant
facts, it remains strongly fact- and policy-oriented. As a consequence, it does not
directly engage with questions of legal responsibility and refrains from the use of
21 UN Srebrenica report, paras. 7–8 and p. 57.
22 UN Srebrenica report, p. 57.
23 UN Srebrenica report, paras. 190–200 and 481.
24 M. Perelman, New documents shed light on Srebrenica failings 20 years on, France 24, 13 July 2015.
25 UN Srebrenica report, para. 280.
26 UN Srebrenica report, para. 291.
27 NIOD (2002), p. 2195.
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legal terms as much as possible. The background description of the Yugoslav break-
up touches on some findings with normative implications but generally legal
questions are circumvented. For instance, on Resolution 713, which established the
legally challenged arms embargo,28 the report remarks that, ‘several observers noted
at the time that the major effect of the embargo would be to freeze the military
holdings of each of the parties—a move which would overwhelmingly benefit the
Serbs, who were dominant both in the Yugoslav military and, to a lesser extent in
the arms industry’.29 In a similar vein, the legal classification of the conflict was
outsourced to the ICRC.30 Yet, in other instances in the background description the
report does make findings of a direct legal nature, e.g., when it holds that the Serb
restriction of humanitarian aid was, apparently, not intended to starve the
population.31 Yet, overall, the report is fact-focused rather than law-focused. Most
intriguingly from a 2015 perspective and the commemorating Security Council
Resolution that was blocked by Russia because it featured the word ‘genocide’,32
the UN inquiry report of 1999 speaks only of an ‘attempted genocide’.33
As regards the evaluations and appraisals, it has been observed that the UN
inquiry displayed, ‘a degree of self-criticism (that) is rare for any large organization
and particularly rare for the United Nations’.34 Indeed, the Special Representative’s
update on the situation in Srebrenica on 10 July was disqualified in the report as
‘substantially inaccurate’.35 Even more straightforward was the judgement that the
repeated public declarations that air power would only be used against the Serbs as a
last resort were ‘wrong’, as was the acceptance of the daily shelling of the safe
areas.36 Yet the appraisal of the involved Member States’ actions and their inactions
was at times evasive, which may have been inspired by diplomatic considerations.
The final assessment of Dutchbat’s operation is balanced. It reads,
it is easy to say with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of what
followed that the Netherlands battalion did not do enough to protect those who
28 Resolution 713 was challenged by Bosnia before the ICJ. Bosnia held that the Security Council
Resolution imposing an arms embargo upon the former Yugoslavia must not be construed in a manner
that would not impair Bosnia and Herzegovina’s right of self-defence. ICJ, Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order, 13 September
1993 and the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, paras. 98–104.
29 UN Srebrenica report, para. 12, but see also para. 490 which states that the arms embargo was not
necessarily a mistake, even if it effectively deprived the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of its
inherent right to self-defence.
30 UN Srebrenica report, para. 16.
31 UN Srebrenica report, paras. 21 and 22. See for the relevant legal framework, Art. 54 of Additional
Protocol I and Art. 14 of Additional Protocol II. More generally on Humanitarian Assistance, see the
report of the Dutch Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law of August 2014, report No.
25, available at: http://www.cavv-advice.com.
32 UN Docs. S/2015/508 and S/PV.7481, 8 July 2015.
33 UN Srebrenica report, paras. 491, 501, 505. Interesting is the reference in para. 63 to a Security
Council Missions document UN Doc. S/25700 which uses the word genocide more unreservedly.
34 UN Brahimi report, p. iii.
35 UN Srebrenica report, para. 282.
36 UN Srebrenica report, para. 483.
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sought refuge in its compound. Perhaps the soldiers should have allowed
everyone into the compound and then offered themselves as human shields to
protect them. This might have slowed down the Serbs and bought time for
higher-level negotiations to take effect. At the same time, it is also possible
that the Serb forces would then have shelled the compound, killing thousands
in the process, as they had threatened to do. Ultimately, it is not possible to say
with any certainty that stronger actions by Dutchbat would have saved lives,
and it is even possible that such efforts could have done more harm than
good.37
The only direct reproach that is being made towards Dutchbat personnel regards
the failure to report on the ‘sinister indications’ of unfolding scenes after the
enclave’s fall.38 It thus seems that the report’s criticisms primarily concern the UN
as an institution, its safe area policy and the joint miscarriages regarding timely air
support, rather than individual Member States and their officials.
4 The NIOD Study
Srebrenica became a national trauma for the Netherlands. It has led to several
domestic inquiries. Dutchbat’s Debriefings report in October 1995 did not respond
to all queries that had arisen regarding the responsibilities of Dutch troops and the
political leaders involved. Subsequently, when it appeared that some film material
made by Dutch troops during the fall capturing the mass killings had been
destroyed, new queries arose. As the public debate regarding the Dutch involvement
in and the responsibilities for the fall of Srebrenica lingered on, the Dutch
government decided in the summer of 1996 to launch an inquiry.39 Initially, the
Dutch government believed that a comprehensive inquiry at the international level
would provide the best insight. However, this idea did not resonate with other
relevant States nor with implicated international organizations and these were
reluctant to engage in such an exercise.40 Subsequently, therefore, the Dutch
government requested the NIOD to investigate the events before, during and after
the fall of Srebrenica against the background of the political and military situation in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. This request was supported by a parliamentary majority, while
a minority preferred a parliamentary inquiry.41 A decisive factor that made NIOD
37 UN Srebrenica report, para. 473.
38 UN Srebrenica report, para. 474.
39 NIOD (2002), p. 9. In 1998, a separate inquiry was launched into the disappearance of other film
material and the broader questions whether the Ministry of Defence was cooperating sufficiently in
reporting about the fall of Srebrenica. This inquiry was led by Van Kemenade. It concluded that the
Ministry had indeed cooperated sufficiently, but did question the adequacy of the investigations into the
misbehaviour of certain Dutch troops, Parliamentary Records TK 26122, nos. 5–6 (1998–1999), 28
September 1998.
40 NIOD (2002), prologue, p. 9.
41 Ibid.
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accept the mission was its perception of a Dutch societal desire for more clarity on
what had happened in Srebrenica.42
The NIOD Srebrenica inquiry was unique in its type. Not only was its historic
orientation different from other formal inquiry exercises regarding international
affairs, but also from the perspective of the historical academic discipline, reporting
on such recent events while the conflict was still ongoing and while new
developments were unfolding was an unprecedented and perhaps even precarious
exercise.43 Given that the situation in the former Yugoslavia was still in full flux, the
Srebrenica assignment required innovative approaches which arguably trespassed
accepted methods of research in contemporary history.44 For example, the NIOD
report relied on materials of the ICTY Prosecutor while the criminal investigations
were ongoing, and sometimes even before cases against specific accused had
opened.45
The specific assignment given to NIOD was to gather all relevant facts and on
this basis to offer an insight from a historical perspective and in both a national and
an international context into the causes and events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica
and its aftermath.46 Specific elements mentioned that needed clarification included
the UN concept of ‘safe areas’, the operation and command structure of the UN
peacekeeping force, decision-making within the UN and NATO, Dutch decision-
making and parliamentary involvement therein, the actions of Dutchbat, the
question regarding air support, the blockade and seizure of Srebrenica and the acts
of the Bosnian Serbs after the fall of the enclave.47 Hence, NIOD was faced with a
complex web of questions that were each of a very distinct character and required
different investigative expertise.
The inquiry was characterized as historical and scientific.48 The deadline given
for the completion of the report was ‘as soon as possible’,49 but ultimately this
turned out to be more than five years later. The report was presented to the Dutch
government on 10 April 2002 and counted 3,368 pages. It offers a wealth of
information. Yet, its comprehensiveness seems to be both its strength and its
weakness. The report has been criticized for not offering any clear answers.50 Its
wide breadth may even bestow it with a certain Wikipedian character offering an
abundance of facts established in different ways and by different people.51 Indeed,
where the principal author of the UN report, Harland, could offer a first-hand
account with the authority of a person who lived through the conflict, and where he
did so in a timely and concise manner, the NIOD investigators obtained their
42 NIOD (2002), p. 10.
43 Lagrou (2003), p. 328.
44 Lagrou (2003), p. 328. See also the authors of the report in Blom and De Graaff (2003), p. 118.
45 Lagrou (2003), p. 331.
46 Parliamentary Records TK 25069, no. 1 (1996–1997), 18 October 1996.
47 Parliamentary Records TK 25069, no. 1 (1996–1997), 18 October 1996.
48 Parliamentary Records TK 25069, no. 1 (1996–1997), 18 October 1996.
49 Parliamentary Records TK 25069, no. 1 (1996–1997), 18 October 1996.
50 Runia (2015).
51 Baudet (2003), pp. 16–17.
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assignment after the concrete events had already occurred, in November 1996, and
they had to become acquainted with the conflict and the happenings ex post facto.
As historians, the methodological starting point was a literature study.52 This was
complemented with interviews. A number of factors affected the methods chosen
and complicated access to sources. Firstly, as regards the method, interviewing in
conflict zones, and particularly the interviewing of individuals who are possibly
implicated in crimes, requires special expertise which might go beyond regular
historical research. More generally, as regards interviewing techniques, the report
observed that interviewing under oath is not an instrument belonging to the
contemporary-historical researcher.53 This instrument is used for criminal or
parliamentary investigations which lead to decisions on responsibility affecting
concrete individuals. Historical research has a different aim, namely to obtain an
insight which is as comprehensive and complete as possible in a given episode.54
A second complicating factor related to access to sources, as key individuals such
as Mladic´ and Karadzic´ were not available for the NIOD investigators. NIOD also
explicitly regretted the refusal of the French Generals to cooperate, including
General Janvier, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR during the fall.55 Similarly,
NIOD was denied access by the Dutch government to the 1995 Debriefing
declarations.56 The Dutch government, and particularly the Ministry of Defence,
emphasized the importance of a strong disconnection between the debriefing and
potential investigations into criminal acts.57 Interestingly, according to the Dutch
Court of Appeal in the criminal complaints case against Karremans, the interests of
the Ministry of Defence in an optimal debriefing had perhaps too excessively
outweighed the interests of justice.58 As noted by NIOD, the ICTY was eventually
granted access to all Debriefing files by the Dutch government. This difference in
treatment between NIOD and the ICTY can possibly be explained by the fact that
the ICTY did not focus on Dutch individuals as suspects but only as witnesses,
whereas the NIOD report could ultimately be a lead for criminal investigators
against Dutch peacekeepers.59
Being an exercise of historical orientation, the NIOD report does not zoom in on
questions of responsibility. Its overall aim was to contextualize, comprehend and
explain and not to offer judgement.60 In accordance with this mission, the NIOD
displays an awareness of the legal value that certain terms carry throughout its
52 NIOD (2002), p. 13.
53 NIOD (2002), p. 17.
54 NIOD (2002), p. 18.
55 NIOD (2002), pp. 20–22.
56 NIOD (2002), pp. 16–17.
57 NIOD (2002), pp. 2972–2973.
58 According to Art. 12 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals can request the court to
order the Public Prosecution Service to open a prosecution. An Art. 12 complaint was lodged regarding
the initiation of prosecutions against Karremans and others, but was dismissed. See Mehida Mustafic´-
Mujic´ et al. v. Karremans et al., supra n. 2, para. 7.3.1.
59 Ibid.
60 Blom (2002).
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report. For instance, it notes that the word ‘refugee’ may not, legally-technically
speaking, be applicable given the internal dimensions of the situation.61 Similarly,
the report appreciates the distinction between the terms evacuation and deportation
and it underscores that a situation of violence and intimidation may render the idea
of ‘free choice’ non-existent.62 It subsequently provides a sort of disclaimer
indicating that it uses these words without the intention of giving an exact legal
appraisal. In a similar vein, the report does not shy away from using the word
‘genocide’, but it does explicate that it utilizes this burdened word in a non-legal
sense and that it adheres to the public use of this word to allude to the fall of
Srebrenica.63
The report is thus clearly meant to be non-judgemental. Yet, it is tremendously
rich in detail and description and it offers a wealth of facts. It may not therefore be
surprising that in particular ICTY defence attorneys often spotted useful leads for
their defence case. They have invoked the report frequently and in their view the
NIOD report is, ‘the largest and most thorough study of events related to the fall of
Srebrenica’.64
5 The Political and Judicial Reception of the Two Inquiry Reports
The political reception of the two reports differed markedly. The principal follow-
up at the UN level to the Harland report was the publication of another report. The
UN’s failure in Srebrenica as recorded in the report of December 1999 precipitated
the more general and thematic inquiry undertaken by Brahimi’s High-Level Panel.
The Brahimi panel charted peacekeeping doctrines and strategies and contrasted
those with past experiences and practices to offer a basis for further recommen-
dations. Other than this, the publication of the 1999 UN Srebrenica report had no
effective and public political repercussions for the UN, the Member States or
individual staff members.
In contrast, the NIOD report had quite dramatic consequences. Upon its
presentation, the Dutch government led by Wim Kok resigned. Subsequently, on 5
June 2002, a parliamentary commission was established to make definitive political
findings on the actions of the Dutch Parliament, the Dutch government and the
military and political leaders responsible before, during and after the events in
Srebrenica. This commission concluded in January 2003, inter alia, that the
resignation of the Kok II government in April 2002 had indeed been justified. The
main substantive conclusions of the report, entitled Mission without peace, were
that:
61 NIOD (2002), p. 2597. The report also underscored, though, that this finding might have further
implications for the status of the safe area vis-a`-vis the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic
of Srpska.
62 NIOD (2002), pp. 2598–2599. See on this distinction also the Karremans judgement, supra n. 2.
63 NIOD (2002), p. 2653. See also p. 13 where it is explained that reservations regarding the use of the
word genocide are inspired by the wish to prevent conflation with criminal prosecutions.
64 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Defence Final Trial Brief, 1 October 2012,
para. 137.
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• Dutchbat had been dispatched to Srebrenica without a clear mandate and prior
objections of the military were too easily bypassed;
• Dutchbat did not make attempts to accompany the men until the end when those
were evacuated from Potocˇari;
• Hesitant actions by the French UN General Janvier led to the omission to
provide air support when Srebrenica was on the point of being taken;
• General Couzy had created problems for the Minister of Defence by withholding
information about war crimes.65
In parallel, a separate parliamentary commission investigated decision-making
on Dutch participation to peacekeeping missions and concluded that such decision-
making often took place on the basis of insufficient information. The commission
drafted an assessment framework with criteria for future participation.66
Similar to this mixed picture of the political follow-up, the judicial reception of
both reports is also multifaceted. The relevance and influence of each report to the
judicial domain depended on sequencing, the identity of the recipient judicial
institution as well as the nature of the case and the prevalent legal questions. Given
the chronological circumstance that ICTY investigations and proceedings had been
ongoing ever since 1993, the ICTY turned out to be more of a benefactor to the
inquiry exercises than a potential beneficiary.
The ICJ judgment in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia was rendered well after the
publication of the reports, as were the Dutch Srebrenica cases against the
Netherlands and the United Nations. Given that the latter case did not reach the
merits stage, the reports were not discussed there. Yet in the other Dutch civil cases
as well as in the criminal complaints case against Karremans, Franken and
Oosterveen, the inquiries were indeed referred to and relied on, albeit with
variations. The ICJ referenced both reports, but paid significantly more respect to
the UN report. After substantial quotes from the UN report regarding methodology,
it concluded, ‘The care taken in preparing the report, its comprehensive sources and
the independence of those responsible for its preparation all lend considerable
authority to it.’67
In contrast, the Dutch court of first instance in Mothers of Srebrenica v. The
Netherlands relied much more extensively on the NIOD report. This difference
between the ICJ and the Dutch courts obviously originates in their distinct scope of
jurisdiction. Moreover, it can be explained by the alignment between the NIOD’s
extensive treatment of Dutchbat’s operations and the focus of litigation before the
Dutch courts.
In general, the relevance of inquiry reports for judicial processes can be
multifold. For all engaged actors in the courtroom, such reports can fulfil an
65 Missie zonder vrede, see supra n. 2, pp. 413 et seq.
66 Parliamentary Records TK 23.591, no. 5 (1999–2000), 4 September 2000 (Vertrekpunt Den Haag).
67 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2007, p. 43, para. 230; see also
the Declaration by Judge Keith, p. 352.
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informative function sketching a general background of the adjudicated issues.68 As
indicated, inquiry reports share this informative function with other public sources,
also those of an informal nature like NGO reports. In addition to providing general
background information, inquiry reports can also be referenced in judgements for
more immediately relevant contextual descriptions, for the establishment of simple
facts, for the determination of facts that have direct legal bearing, for an appraisal of
given facts and situations, or for legal conclusions and findings. Reports may in
exceptional situations even have a certain precedential value when their legal
reasoning and qualifications are adopted by courts.69 In the case of Mothers of
Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, the court of first instance recognized the different
roles that inquiry reports can play. It underlined that the conclusions of both reports
were not equally accepted by the parties to the dispute and therefore the court held
that it would not involve these conclusions in its judicial decision-making. Yet, it
indicated that findings of simple facts in the report could serve as a basis for parts of
its judgement.70 In reality, of course, the distinction between simple facts,
inferences, appraisals and legal conclusions is blurred. And indeed, the court did go
further than simply borrowing crude or naked facts. On occasion, it also
incorporated conclusions from the inquiries.71
In the decision on the criminal complaint against Karremans and others, the
court also relied very much on the NIOD report. However, the court indicated that
the conclusions from the civil case against the state could not be automatically
transferred to a criminal case since the civil case established the knowledge of
Dutchbat as such, whose acts were attributable to the state, while the criminal case
concerned individual responsibility.72 In a similar way, it would be proper to
differentiate between the extent to which respective courts can rely on inquiry
findings. Given the higher evidentiary thresholds, criminal courts in actual trials
might well have to be more reserved towards inquiry facts as a basis for direct legal
findings regarding culpability than civil courts in state liability cases.73
6 The Function of Inquiry Exercises in the International Legal Order
As set out in Sect. 1, the function of inquiry is informed by its subject-matter.
Leaving the technical inquiries apart, the function of conflict and security inquiries
can be further differentiated on the basis of chronology. Inquiries that operate
simultaneously with the scrutinized events have an informative function, and they
68 See e.g., Nuhanovic´ v. Staat der Nederlanden, District Court The Hague, 10 September 2008,
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BF0184, footnotes 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15.
69 Re (2013), pp. 288–290, indicating that the ICTY accepted the test developed by the Commission of
Inquiry determining the extent of a commander’s responsibility.
70 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. Staat der Nederlanden, District Court of The Hague, 16 July
2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8562, para. 4.8.
71 Ibid., e.g., para. 4.190.
72 Mehida Mustafic´-Mujic´ et al. v. Karremans et al., supra n. 2, para. 12.4.
73 See Jacobs and Stahn (2014).
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may also be geared towards influencing the ongoing conflict and sorting a certain
preventive effect. They may purposefully and strategically use legal language to
prompt action by other actors. The objective of specific prevention no longer plays a
role for retrospective inquiries, and there is thus no parallel need for a similar
strategic use of international law. In fact, retrospective inquiries may rather display
reservation towards the use of international law, as indeed demonstrated by the
analysis in Sects. 2 and 3 of the UN and NIOD inquiries. In terms of perspective,
retrospective inquiries coincide with legal accountability processes. This simulta-
neousness requires differentiation so as not to duplicate or commingle and it induces
inquiry commissions to adopt a reserved attitude towards international law so as not
to pre-empt formal legal findings.
The two mechanisms of inquiry and judicial process do share synergies to the
extent that they focus on questions of answerability and accountability. However,
while criminal processes focus on questions of guilt and criminal responsibility,
inquiries are ultimately predominantly driven by a desire to uncover and understand
and to learn lessons, and this may be combined with addressing questions of
accountability in a non-legal sense. These inquiry objectives presuppose a certain
contextualization of events with a view to highlighting their multifaceted nature.
The lenses through which a conflict is deciphered are shaped by the exact mandate
of an inquiry exercise but these will always be broader than those of a criminal
prosecutor. The NIOD inquiry was special given its particularly wide breath and its
historic-scientific nature. Its wide mandate did not offer much guidance as regards
the selection of which constituted relevant facts. Indeed, the NIOD understood its
task to be: offering ‘a reconstruction of events as an intrinsically dynamic historical
process with the highest achievable level of accuracy and substantiation’.74
In contrast to inquiry mechanisms and their underlying aspiration to reconstruct
what happened, legal processes primarily respond to a desire for justice, vindication,
and redress. These processes, and particularly crime adjudications, decontextualize
as they zero in on concrete individuals and are more binary in character. As
observed by Van der Wilt in his contribution to this special issue,75 the construction
of reality through legal categories of individual criminal responsibility may have a
certain distorting effect. In criminal trials, only a few facts are established, and they
are established rigorously. In inquiry processes generally a greater set of facts is
offered and these are not tied up to legal categories. Yet the inquiry methodologies
are not guided by strict rules of procedure and evidence and inquiry facts are thus
constructed in a less scrupulous manner.
In a more generic sense, the mechanism of inquiry may seem to respond to the
concerns of some scholars about international criminal processes.76 Koskenniemi
has underscored the impossibility of reducing conflict to one individual and he
questioned the propriety of international criminal law on this ground.77 Based on a
similar observation, Nollkaemper has argued that individual criminal responsibility
74 NIOD (2002), p. 29.
75 Van der Wilt (2015).
76 See generally, Tallgren (2002).
77 Koskenniemi (2002).
Accountability Through Fact-Finding 309
123
is an insufficient response to system criminality and that other legal avenues should
be explored to capture the collective nature of the crimes.78 Nollkaemper has
developed the concept of shared responsibility to better account for the co-existence
of different forms of legal responsibility. The inquiries into the fall of Srebrenica
indeed demonstrate that responsibility can be dispersed over different actors and
that it exists in different shapes and degrees, ranging from criminal to civil and
beyond. The Srebrenica inquiries also show that certain forms of involvement are
better framed in terms of political and moral responsibility and cannot easily be
translated into legal categories. The inquiries paint a picture of what can perhaps be
called ‘shattered responsibility’, since they depict a multilayered web of respon-
sibilities of different levels and categories. As the institutional corollary of this idea
of ‘shattered responsibility’, a case can be made for greater emphasis on non-legal
responses to conflict and international crimes so as to render these non-legal forms
of responsibility more visible.
Inquiry is a soft mechanism. It does not have the attraction of direct coerciveness,
but it may be better attuned than legal processes to grasp the complexity of a
situation in its entirety. This is not to say that inquiry should replace international
criminal processes but it should rather be seen as a complementary response.
Srebrenica occurred in the heyday of international criminal justice. Yet, twenty
years later, an understanding has emerged that international criminal justice is in
itself not a sufficient response and that it should never be a stand-alone exercise. It
must be complemented by other responses. The institution of inquiry may fulfil such
a complementary function as it can address societal demands for the accountability
of a wider range of actors. The Srebrenica inquiries have demonstrated how such
functions can effectively be fulfilled. Underlining the relevance and importance of
retrospective inquiries may thus be said to belong to the institutional legacy of
Srebrenica.
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